

# OUTSTACK

Outside Perspectives on Voter Registration Security

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**Election Verification Network - 2019**  
March 14 & 15, 2019 – Washington, DC

# Disclaimer

- This represents my work and that of my colleagues at OutStack
- Not performed under the banner of any other employer or organization
- OutStack is party agnostic

# OutStack Technologies

- Public Benefit Corporation established in Washington, DC
- Focused on campaign and election infrastructure cyberdefense
- Our automated platform:
  - Detects copycat sites
  - Prevents online donation theft
  - Provides a baseline security checkup
  - Recommends related domains for defensive acquisition
  - Identifies vulnerabilities and malware in election infrastructure

# Experience

- National Institute of Standards & Technology
- Election Assistance Commission
- Center for Election Systems
- Pollworker in more states than anyone I know (9)
- 15 years working with vote capture and tabulation systems
- 7 years working with candidates and campaigns

# Attacks on VR Systems

- In 2016, DHS notified 21 states of potential attacks on their online voter registration systems [12]
  - Many states denied they were even scanned
  - Illinois confirmed a breach
- Beginning of a better partnership between states and federal government regarding threat intelligence sharing
- Spurred our investigation into the security of these systems

Alabama  
Alaska  
Arizona  
California  
Colorado  
Connecticut  
Delaware  
Florida  
Illinois  
Iowa  
Maryland  
Minnesota  
Ohio  
Oklahoma  
Oregon  
North Dakota  
Pennsylvania  
Texas  
Virginia  
Washington  
Wisconsin

# White Hat Activities

- Created *ElectionBuster* in 2012 to identify fake candidate sites
- Scanned 2,000+ candidates in 2018 with *ElectionBuster*
  - Reported hundreds of vulnerabilities to candidates
  - Also reported malware, sensitive personal information, and fake sites
- Due to 2016 attacks, began assessing internet facing infrastructure owned by local and state governments

## 2012 General Election

- ✓ Presidential

## 2014 General Election

- ✓ Presidential
- ✓ Senate
- ✓ House
- ✓ PACs

## 2016 General Election

- ✓ Presidential
- ✓ Senate
- ✓ House
- ✓ PACs
- ✓ Gubernatorial


## 2018 General Election

- ✓ Presidential
- ✓ Senate
- ✓ House
- ✓ PACs
- ✓ Gubernatorial
- ✓ Voter registration
- ✓ Election websites

# Internet Facing Election Tech


- Internet facing election infrastructure includes:
  - Online voter registration portals
  - State Board of Election (SBoE) / SoS homepages
  - Election Night Reporting portals
- VR systems are new, whereas SBoE / SoS sites are ... around the same age as the rest of election infrastructure
- VR were much more secure than election websites
- At the time of our scans, 37 states used online VR systems
- Many states used .gov for Voter Reg, also saw .org and .us

# 2018 Voter Registration Site Grades






# 2018 VR Vulnerabilities




## BEAST

■ 10 ■ 27




## HEARTBLEED

■ 37




## POODLE


■ 37



# 2018 SBoE / SoS Site Grades




# 2018 SBoE / SoS Site Vulnerabilities




## BEAST

■ 38 ■ 37




## HEARTBLEED

■ 75



## POODLE

■ 72 ■ 3 ■



# American Samoa



- Runs separate .gov and .org sites
  - Not the only organization to do this
- Site infected via a Drupal vulnerability
- Often to view the infected site, you need to approach from an IP outside the US
- Contacted AS for remediation and advised federal authorities and EI-ISAC

# Contacting Election Officials

- Finding the right people at the states was difficult
- Often times email addresses were simply not available
  - Hackers do not want to use a contact form
- Time zones were an occasional issue
- Resorted to sending election officials DMs over Twitter
  - This worked!
- Eventually received proper contacts from many people in this room

# Finishing Up

- After presenting this work at DEF CON, members of the National Guard from multiple states reached out:
  - Found them to be extremely competent
  - Independent confirmation of issues
- Officials from 4 states asked us to do county-level scans
- States not setup to work with external entities
- Given permission, more in-depth scans are possible


# Recommendations

- 2FA for all critical systems
- Purchase common domains, such as the dot com version of your site ([RegisterPennsylvania.com](https://RegisterPennsylvania.com))
- Purchase and maintain a trusted certificate
- TLS 1.2+ w/ strong algorithms & HSTS pre-load list
- EI-ISAC / DHS can help with intel and remediation
- Obtain outside assessments - vet providers
- Make it easy to contact you: [security@yourstate.gov](mailto:security@yourstate.gov)

Extended slides and data are available at:

**[pleasego.vote](https://pleasego.vote)**

[josh@outstack.vote](mailto:josh@outstack.vote)



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